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Abstract: For several decades, demographic forecasts had predicted that the ma-
jority of Germany’s cities and rural areas would experience population decline in the 
early 21st century. Instead, recent trends show a growing population size in three 
out of every four German districts. As a result, there are currently severe shortages 
of housing and childcare in regions that were projected to decline but have instead 
grown in recent years. Other regions, by contrast, continue to lose young people 
in particular. Most of these differences between regions stem from within-country 
as well as international migration. An important question for both regional demo-
graphic research as well as local policy-makers is thus how well net migration rates 
in cities and rural districts can be predicted several years into the future. In this 
study, we develop models that predict migration (both within-country as well as 
international migration) at the level of municipalities for two demographic groups, 
namely young people aged 18 to 24 years, and families (people aged 30 to 49 years 
and underage children). We collect data on economic, demographic and other char-
acteristics such as distances to large cities or universities for around 3,000 German 
municipalities (Gemeinden). The model is trained on a subset of these data from 
the period 2005-2009 and predicts net migration rates among young people on an 
unseen test dataset in the future (i.e. for the period 2011-2015). The results show 
that the model can predict future net migration by young people aged 18 to 24 years 
reasonably well (R² > 0.5), although there were quite signifi cant changes during the 
period under study, for example refugee immigration to Germany. Family migration, 
on the other hand, cannot be predicted equally well (R² = 0.25). Some important les-
sons emerge concerning the predictability of regional and international migration 
and the usefulness of demographic forecasts for local policy-makers.
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1 Introduction
Germany’s population will decline drastically throughout the 21st century – this 
had been the predominant belief among demographers, politicians and the general 
public in Germany for decades. In its 2009 forecasts, the German Federal Statisti-
cal Offi ce was still predicting a substantial drop in the national population from 82 
million to between 65 and 70 million by 2060 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2009). In 
recent years, however, the demographic outlook has changed dramatically. As of 
2019, more people live in Germany than ever before. And according to the 2019 
revision of the offi cial forecasts, this is unlikely to change in the coming decades 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 2019). Instead of the “demographic implosion” that had 
often been envisioned, Germany’s population size is likely to remain above 80 mil-
lion by mid-century. The Federal Statistical Offi ce’s estimates are in line with other 
recent forecasts (e.g. Fuchs et al. 2018; Vanella/Deschermeier 2018; Weber 2019) 
which arrive at much higher values for mid-century population size than had long 
been assumed. 
It goes without saying, however, that there are strong regional differences within 
Germany regarding the demographic outlook. Some metropolitan areas are prepar-
ing for population density to increase more and more in the near future, whereas 
other regions are already experiencing quite dramatic rates of out-migration by 
mainly young people and, as a consequence, accelerated demographic ageing and 
decline (Schlömer 2006; Mai/Scharein 2009). But again, local forecasts have been 
proven wrong by the reality in many regions. For instance, a decade ago, the Ger-
man Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs, and Spatial Develop-
ment (BBSR) predicted that the majority of districts and cities (Kreise und kreisfreie 
Städte) in Germany will experience a population decline between 2005 and 2025 
(BBSR 2008). Even in the federal states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg in the 
south of the country, both of which experienced strong economic and demographic 
growth in the past, many regions were projected to stagnate or decline (see also 
Swiaczny 2015). 
This is in contrast with the actual recent (2011-2015) trend displayed in Figure 1. 
The general geographic pattern of growth versus decline matches the predictions 
by the BBSR and others: the populations of rural regions in the eastern states most-
ly declined, whereas big cities and their surrounding areas increased in population 
size. However, there are also marked differences between predictions and reality. 
Between 2011 and 2015, only 23 percent of all German districts actually experienced 
population decline, instead of the majority that had been expected by the BBSR. 
This means that around 30 percent of all German districts – many of them smaller 
cities and rural areas – were projected to decline but instead gained inhabitants. 
Of course, it is still uncertain whether this trend will continue over the coming 
years. But the current trend already has considerable consequences in many areas, 
including a severe shortage of housing and child care, overcrowded public and pri-
vate transport in large as well as smaller cities, and a considerable backlash against 
efforts to protect the environment and the fi ght against climate change (Weber/Sci-
ubba 2019). In the past, many cities got rid of public housing projects or cut educa-
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tion budgets because it was thought they were not needed in a future characterised 
by population ageing and decline. Today, soaring housing prices and a shortage of 
teachers and child care workers are among the main problems frequently cited by 
local politicians. Thus, demographic forecasts that turn out to be wrong can clearly 
cause substantial problems in many policy areas.
The main reason for the sudden turnaround in German demography is obvious. 
Between 2012 and 2016 alone, net immigration to Germany amounted to more than 
three million people, whereas the Federal Statistical Offi ce’s (Statistisches Bunde-
samt 2009) forecasts only expected between half a million in the “low” immigration 
variant and one million immigrants in the “high” variant to settle permanently in the 
same period. Not only did the surge in refugee migration (especially during 2015) 
contribute to these fi gures, but also sharp increases in other types of immigration, 
Fig. 1: Population growth in German districts between 2011 and 2015
Stuttgart
Munich
Dresden
Berlin Five−year change between
2011 and 2015:
< −2%
−2% to −1%
−1% to 0
0 to 1%
1% to 2%
2% to 3%
3% to 4%
4% to 5%
> 5%
Note that the subsequent analyses will use data on the smaller-scale municipalities (Ge-
meinden, N > 10,000), but the visual inspection is easier using the larger aggregation.
Source: own calculations, Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018)
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above all intra-EU movements from the new accession states in the East and South-
East. 
International migration is the most diffi cult component in demographic pro-
jections. Sharp fl uctuations in migration are the main reason why demographic 
forecasts in Europe have not become more accurate over time, despite massive 
advances in computational power and statistical methods (Keilman 2008). As an 
example, the forecasts by Alders et al. (2007) assumed that migration to Germany 
until 2050 would be moderate, and lower than migration to other EU countries such 
as Portugal or Spain. The authors justifi ed this by stating that the high fl ows of refu-
gees were “probably over”, labour migration from Central and Eastern Europe was 
assumed to be more balanced, and high unemployment in Germany would deter 
immigration (Alders et al. 2007: 60). All of these trends have seen a drastic reversal 
just a few years after publication of the forecasts. 
Evidently, it is still unclear whether net migration to Germany will remain higher 
than the Federal Statistical Offi ce’s “high immigration” variant of 200,000 people 
per year as is currently the case (in 2018, this fi gure was 386,000), or whether it 
will, for instance, drop to the previous decade’s (2000-2009) average fi gure of just 
96,000. But migration has by far the largest impact on the accuracy of demographic 
forecasts (e.g. Weber 2015a). Fertility and mortality have only changed gradually 
throughout the past decades, but migration has been very volatile, changing from 
negative net migration in 2009 to a historical record fi gure in 2015, all within the 
space of a few years. Moreover, contrary to previous occasions when vast differ-
ences were recorded in fertility or mortality rates between cities and rural areas, to-
day there are only minor differences across German regions as far as these two indi-
cators are concerned (Bujard/Scheller 2017). Thus, the uncertainty of demographic 
forecasts for cities and regions stems mainly from inter-regional and international 
migration.
How well, then, can regional population fi gures be forecast into the future? The 
aim of this study is to develop a model to predict future net migration (including 
both within-country mobility and international migration) for German municipalities 
based on various socio-economic, demographic, and geographic characteristics. 
We focus on relocations into municipalities by two demographic groups, namely 
young people aged 18 to 24 years, and middle-aged families (people aged 30 to 49 
with underage children). Attracting younger demographic groups is often stated as 
a goal for cities and regions that are facing population ageing and decline. This does 
not mean that only young people contribute to economic growth; on the contrary, 
research fi nds that having many workers in their forties leads to greater levels of 
productivity in a country as opposed to having a younger workforce (Feyrer 2007). 
In addition, many demographers challenge the notion that low fertility and popu-
lation ageing are per se problematic, fi nding that per capita income can actually 
benefi t from below-replacement fertility and a moderately declining population size 
(Lee et al. 2014). There are many aspects, including environmental considerations, 
that might be taken into account in a normative discussion of population ageing and 
decline which goes beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless, younger people 
How Well Can the Migration Component of Regional Population Change be Predicted?    • 147
are clearly regarded by local governments as an economic advantage and an asset 
against demographic ageing. 
The question, therefore, is as follows: Can the migration component of regional 
population change be predicted at all? Or are the possibilities of cities and regions 
for anticipating future demographic developments limited, given the recent chang-
es in trends? 
2 Regional migration in Germany: recent trends
Before turning to predictions, it is fi rst instructive to look at descriptive trends in 
residential mobility and migration in Germany in recent years. These trends con-
stitute the explanandum and the variation that can be captured by the subsequent 
models. Figures 2 and 3 show the geographic variation in net migration into districts 
between 2011 and 2015. Note that the numbers include both international migrants 
as well as within-country mobility.
As Figure 2 shows, young people aged 18 to 24 years display a clear pattern of 
leaving rural areas and moving into big cities. There are a few notable differences 
across regions, though. The surrounding areas of Berlin or Dresden see many of 
their young inhabitants leave for the cities. In Munich or Stuttgart, by contrast, the 
surrounding districts are gaining young inhabitants as well. 
The geographic pattern for families with underage children (Fig. 3) stands in 
marked contrast to the mobility behaviour of young adults. Looking at middle-aged 
people and children, we see big cities mostly losing these inhabitants while the sub-
urban areas, especially around Berlin and Munich, show a massive increase. 
It is also important to look at the temporal stability of these trends. Figure 4 
shows changes in migration rates among young adults as well as families in the 
13 largest German cities with a population size of at least 500,000. As the graph 
shows, the changes in the young-age (18 to 24 years) migration rates were generally 
small between 2005 and 2015. Even as early as the period between 2005 and 2009, 
all cities were gaining many young adults on balance (see x-axis), and this pattern 
remained stable up to 2015. Leipzig is an exception. Here, the net migration rate of 
young adults doubled, making the East German city the most popular destination 
(per capita) for young people between 2011 and 2015, followed by nearby Dresden. 
Munich, previously the most popular city among 18 to 24 age group, is the only 
major city where the migration rate decreased slightly over time, presumably due 
to housing prices that are unrivalled in all of Germany. Nevertheless, the greater 
Munich area attracts large numbers of young people who move there from other 
parts of the country in order to work or study there.
If, by contrast, we look at changes in the vertical dimension in Figure 4, the pic-
ture looks drastically different. During the period between 2005 and 2009, all 13 
large German cities were characterised by a negative net migration rate among the 
age groups 30 to 49 and 0 to 17 years. Families had, on average, left these cities for 
the surrounding districts. Just a few years later, however, this trend had reversed 
and eight out of 13 cities are now net receivers of families. 
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Figure 5 shows the same analysis as Figure 4, but in this case the data are limited 
to German nationals in the respective age groups. As indicated by the graph, there 
is a massive decrease in net migration among German families in the largest Ger-
man cities. All cities had already lost German nationals in the age groups 30 to 49 
and 0 to 17 years during the period between 2005 and 2009, but the balance became 
markedly more negative by 2011-2015. This means that the positive total net migra-
tion in this demographic group shown in Figure 4 can be attributed entirely to for-
eign nationals who moved into the big cities in much larger numbers in recent years. 
This is an important insight, showing that an average trend (the increase in fam-
ily migration rates) can mask two contradicting trends that partially cancel each oth-
er out. On the one hand, natives are leaving the big cities in ever greater numbers 
whereas immigrants more than compensate for this loss. On the other hand, young 
immigrants and Germans in the 18 to 24-year age group are moving into the cities, 
and without immigrants the net migration rates would not look drastically different. 
Fig. 2: Net migration rate, age group 18 to 24 years, in German districts 
between 2011 and 2015
Stuttgart
Munich
Dresden
Berlin
Yearly net migration rate 
(per 1,000 inhabitants):
< −26
−26 to −19
−19 to −13
−13 to −8
−8 to 0
0 to 8
8 to 19
19 to 41
41 to 81
> 81
Source: own calculations, Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018)
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3 Regional migration and residential mobility: theoretical 
considerations
In general, two strands of literature provide theoretical accounts that seek to explain 
why people relocate and which places are more attractive to movers than others. 
Macro-level accounts on the determinants of migration focus on the characteristics 
of countries or regions that attract or repel people (e.g. Massey et al. 1993). The 
terminology of “push and pull factors” (Lee 1966) has long transcended the scien-
tifi c literature and infi ltrated into public discourse. Among the founding documents 
for macro-level migration research are Ravenstein’s (1885) classic inquiries into the 
determinants of movements between cities. His “laws” stated, for instance, that 
long-distance migrants tend to target large cities with economic opportunities over 
rural areas. Zipf (1946) formulated the well-known hypothesis that the volume of 
migration between two places is proportional to the product of their population size 
Fig. 3: Net migration rate, age group 30 to 49 years and 0 to 17 years, in 
German districts between 2011 and 2015
Stuttgart
Munich
Dresden
Berlin
Yearly net migration rate 
(per 1,000 inhabitants):
< 2
2 to 5
5 to 8
8 to 9
9 to 11
11 to 12
12 to 14
14 to 15
15 to 17
> 17
Source: own calculations, Bertelsmann Stiftung (2018)
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and inversely proportional to the distance between the two places. These simple 
models have inspired more recent research that relates global migratory movement 
mostly to geographic and demographic characteristics of origin and destination 
countries (e.g. Cohen et al. 2008; Kim/Cohen 2010). 
Besides these “gravity” variables (population size and distance), macro-level 
research into migration most often relates observed migration rates to economic 
prosperity and growth as well as to the labour market (e.g. Lowry 1966). In general, a 
problem for macro-level migration theory based on human capital or gravity models 
is the recurrent fi nding that the number of people that do actually migrate is small, 
despite huge wage differentials and other supposed push- and pull-factors (Speare 
1974). On the one hand, the effect of economic variables such as unemployment is 
not straightforward and sometimes found to be zero or negative (Hatton/Tani 2005; 
Fig. 4: Net migration rate, age group 18 to 24 years (x-axis) and age groups 
30 to 49 years and 0 to 17 years (y-axis), in the 13 largest German cities 
2005-2009 (start of arrow) vs. 2011-2015 (arrowhead) 
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Windzio 2004). On the other hand, non-economic variables are also of importance, 
such as the reluctance to move to culturally different regions even within a country 
(e.g. into regions with different dialects) (Bauernschuster et al. 2014). 
Micro-level theories seek to explain migratory behaviour on the basis of indi-
vidual characteristics of (potential) migrants. The micro-founded neoclassical 
model assumes that people migrate to maximise their well-being and, accordingly, 
migration occurs if the expected utility outweighs the costs of moving (Sjaastad 
1962). Among the individual-level theories, there are also accounts from life course 
research which explain migratory behaviour through psychological models of the 
decision-making process (e.g. Kley 2011). Research on residential mobility often fo-
Fig. 5: Net migration rate among German nationals, age group 18 to 24 years 
(x-axis) and age groups 30 to 49 years and 0 to 17 years (y-axis), in 
the 13 largest German cities 2005-2009 (start of arrow) vs. 2011-2015 
(arrowhead) 
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cuses on individual characteristics such as age, education, employment status, or 
psychological factors such as affi nity to risk (Greenwood 1985). 
Of course, the need to combine micro-level and macro-level models has long 
been voiced (e.g. Cadwallader 1989). In a combined model, “objective” character-
istics of places are perceived by individuals as subjective variables, which the in-
dividuals combine to estimate utility scores of different places (Cadwallader 1989). 
If the subjective attractiveness of a potential destination is greater than the current 
place of residence, an individual disposition for mobility exists (considering migra-
tion) which may translate into actual migratory behaviour, conditional on constrain-
ing factors such as costs (Kalter 1997). As a general framework, the concept of 
subjective expected utility (SEU) can serve as a starting point for integrating various 
middle-range theories (De Jong et al. 1983). Individuals subjectively evaluate their 
origin as well as potential destination places and compare them to their own aspira-
tions. An SEU model of residential mobility in accordance with Cadwallader (1989: 
497) could be formulated as follows:
where the subjective expected utility SEU of moving to region i is a function of the 
subjective utility ratings U of regional attribute j, weighted by an individual-specifi c 
importance measure w, and the costs C of moving to region i. The attributes consid-
ered by individuals when assigning values to different places might include, among 
others, employment opportunities, length of commute to existing job, green space, 
crime rates, or in case of families the perceived quality of schools. 
Importantly, we assume that the weights that individuals place on these fac-
tors can change over the life course (Kley 2011). That is, individuals in different age 
groups will have different rank orders of places because the subjective importance 
assigned to various regional characteristics has changed. In particular, the pres-
ence or absence of children infl uences personal preferences regarding residential 
location choices and commuting behaviour (Kim et al. 2005). For instance, research 
fi nds that young adults are more likely to plan to leave a city if there are better ca-
reer opportunities in the potential destination or better opportunities to pursue own 
interests relative to the current place of residence. In the family phase, however, 
these effects are absent and instead factors related to family life inspire the plan to 
move (Kley 2011). 
Below, we discuss different preferences for residential mobility among young 
adults and families, focusing on four trends that we deem especially important for 
predicting future patterns of mobility among these two demographic groups in Ger-
many.
???? ? ? ?????
?
???
? ??? (1)
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Educational expansion
Between 2000 and 2015, the share of school leavers attending university increased 
drastically, from around 30 percent to more than 50 percent. This means that while 
two decades ago, the average school leaver started vocational training as part of the 
traditional dual system in Germany, today the majority of school leavers begin some 
form of tertiary education. This has a considerable impact on the residential mobil-
ity of young people. Starting around the year 2000, the large infl ow of young people 
aged 18 to 24 has caused Germany’s big cities to grow once again, counteracting 
the previous decades of de-urbanisation (Gans 2013). Whereas opportunities for vo-
cational training in crafts and trades are available in equal measure in urban as well 
as rural regions, tertiary education is mostly confi ned to cities. An ever increasing 
share of fi rst-year university students among young people implies that secondary 
school leavers will leave rural regions situated a long way from universities in even 
greater numbers. 
This process also affects people’s mobility decisions in later stages of the life 
course. Once a university degree has been obtained, the likelihood of moving back 
to the countryside diminishes since there are fewer employment opportunities for 
job-seekers with tertiary education. After children have been born, tertiary-edu-
cated residents of large metropolitan areas might still express a desire to leave the 
city, but this is constrained by employment opportunities that are largely restricted 
to urban areas. As a consequence, young families living in big cities are likely to 
move into suburban municipalities close to these cities, but less likely to go back to 
the peripheral rural regions where they may have come from (Milbert/Sturm 2016). 
Socio-economic and ethnic segregation
Another feature that consistently predicts residential mobility of family-age people 
in particular is the socio-economic or ethnic composition of an area (e.g. South/
Crowder 1997; van Ham/Feijten 2008). In Germany, there is a close correlation at 
the neighbourhood level between the share of migrants and lower socio-economic 
status, but at the more aggregate regional level, the opposite is true (Weber 2015b). 
Thus, prosperous and ethnically diverse metropolitan areas are presumably attract-
ing families, while at the level of municipalities, the concentration of ethnic minori-
ties is likely to lead to greater out-migration. 
Residential segregation by ethnic background has historically been rather low in 
Germany, as compared with other countries such as France, the United Kingdom, or 
the United States (e.g. Musterd 2005). However, there are also signs that ethnic and 
socio-economic segregation have been on the rise in Germany in recent years. The 
residential segregation of welfare recipients, for instance, has increased in 80 per-
cent of all German cities over the past few years (Helbig/Jähnen 2018). Half of all 
cities now have neighbourhoods in which more than 50 percent of all children are 
dependent on social security transfers (Helbig/Jähnen 2018). In addition, it is well 
known that residential segregation is stronger among recent migrants than among 
migrants from previous waves who tend to move into more mixed neighbourhoods 
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over time (e.g. Friedrichs 1998). As such, the recent sharp increase in immigration 
to Germany is likely to lead to an increase in the level of segregation, at least in the 
short term. 
In line with Schelling’s (1971) well-known theory of segregation, one could as-
sume that municipalities with a growing proportion of migrants or socio-economi-
cally deprived people will, at some point, start witnessing an increase in emigration 
rates among the native population even though there is no historic precedent for 
this. It is likely that there will be a tipping point at which an accelerated level of out-
migration by middle-class members of the municipality is triggered. To a certain 
degree, this can already be observed in big German cities with a negative correla-
tion between the concentration of ethnic minorities in a neighbourhood and the 
net migration rate of natives (Weber 2015b). A high concentration of immigrants is, 
for example, often associated with the fear of a decrease in the educational quality 
of schools due to language problems and cultural misunderstandings (SVR 2016 ). 
However, ethnically mixed but prosperous areas (such as university quarters) are 
still popular (Weber 2015b).
Tight housing markets
One of the most politically salient issues in recent years has been the sharp in-
crease in housing prices throughout most of Germany. A tight housing market has 
previously been linked to low residential mobility in Germany (Clark/Drever 2000). 
Some people might consider moving, but fi nancial constraints impede actual reset-
tlement. For many young adults wishing to move to the city to enrol at university 
or start vocational education, living in the core cities might not be affordable and 
they instead resort to surrounding municipalities with good public transport con-
nections. This is what the descriptive view already suggests for Munich in particular 
(see Fig. 2 and 5). In the family age groups, the desire to leave the city may be ampli-
fi ed by the inability to fi nd larger apartments within the city limits after the birth of 
a child (Busch 2016). 
There is also obviously endogeneity with regard to the effect of housing costs. 
Since demand for housing as a consequence of local population growth is one of 
the most important determinants of intranational variation in housing prices – other 
factors such as the interest rate are constant for all regions – residential mobility af-
fects housing prices at least as much as housing prices affect residential mobility. 
Whereas the former relationship is positive, however, the latter is negative. Rising 
housing prices are thus a strong indicator of population growth in the past, but can 
deter future infl ows if the price level surpasses the acceptance limit of potential in-
movers. 
The housing market also interacts with residential segregation along socio-eco-
nomic or ethnic lines and with geographic location. On the one hand, high rents 
may impede people with a low socio-economic status from moving into certain 
municipalities or prompt them to leave in the case of “gentrifi cation” of previously 
cheaper areas. On the other hand, depending on the demographic composition of 
a municipality, potential in-movers may be more or less willing to pay high housing 
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prices. Municipalities within commuting distance of big, prosperous cities with a 
low proportion of socio-economically deprived residents or ethnic minorities are 
probably most attractive to families who want to move into the broader metropoli-
tan area. In this case, housing prices are likely to be higher. 
Increase in international migration
While the previous theoretical considerations have mostly focused on residential 
mobility within Germany, the descriptive view has already suggested that interna-
tional migration plays a major role in determining the demographic prospects of 
many regions. Mobility patterns of international migrants are different to those of 
internal migrants (compare Fig. 6 and 7). There is abundant evidence that interna-
tional migrants tend to move into big cities where other migrants already live (e.g. 
Mayda 2010). We can thus hypothesise that, in terms of the weighting placed on 
different attributes of a municipality, equation (1) looks different for migrants than 
it does for natives. In particular, we assume that migrants are willing to pay a larger 
share of their income to housing if it allows them to live close to kinship and fellow 
countrymen in the big cities. For recent refugees in particular, it should also be 
noted that their location choices (if they do have a choice) are less sensitive to the 
housing market. 
In sum, the following assumptions can be made about the determinants of resi-
dential mobility among young people and families:
• Young adults’ (18 to 24 years) propensity to move to large cities with univer-
sities will increase over the study period due to the continued expansion of 
tertiary education.
• In the most prosperous cities where housing prices are highest, the surround-
ing areas with access to good public transport connections will also attract 
young people, and fewer school leavers originating from these areas will 
move out of their parental home into the city due to the higher living costs.
• For rural areas farther away from large cities, a crucial aspect in attracting 
young people or preventing them from leaving will be whether universities 
(of applied sciences) are within reach. The labour market and opportunities 
for vocational education still play a vital role, but tertiary education is gaining 
in importance over time.
• Families who value access to green areas, larger living spaces, and schools 
with a low share of socio-economically deprived children are more likely to 
move to suburban or rural areas with low unemployment and high income 
levels compared with large cities. 
• However, since an increasing share of young-to-middle-aged mothers and 
fathers has undergone tertiary education, these suburban or rural areas need 
to be in reach of large cities with a diversifi ed economy. Thus, areas that are 
within short distances of large cities, have access to public transport, and 
only a small number of residents with a low socio-economic status, will likely 
lead to high infl ows of family-age people.
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• Rising housing costs and an increasing concentration in cities of residents 
with a low socio-economic status will accelerate this trend of families moving 
towards suburban and rural areas. 
• Places with a high share of immigrants can be expected to attract more immi-
grants in the future – the volume of these fl ows, however, is highly conditional 
upon national and international factors such as domestic migration policies, 
and is hardly predictable on a local basis.
4 Building predictive models of municipal migration
Explanations versus predictions
Explanations and predictions are both fundamental to science. For Hempel and Op-
penheim (1948: 138), “an explanation of a particular event is not fully adequate un-
less [it] […] could have served as a basis for predicting”. An “explanation” in the 
deductive-nomological tradition is the logical derivation of statements about par-
ticular observations from a more general theoretical model – this is also sometimes 
termed “scientifi c prediction” (Dowding/Miller 2019). A “prediction”, by contrast, 
in our understanding is closer to what Dowding and Miller (2019) call “pragmatic 
prediction”, namely the assignment of values to previously unseen cases (possibly 
in the future), i.e. to cases that were not used to train the model that is the basis 
for prediction. In many disciplines, such as demography and other social sciences, 
applied research often uses a mixture of these approaches. In these disciplines, 
there are no universally applicable laws but often, instead, a set of middle-range 
theories and auxiliary assumptions about the causal mechanisms at work that are 
translated into a statistical model. There is arguably a continuum between a purely 
data-driven predictive model and a purely deductive-hypothetical approach, with 
theory-informed empirical research in the middle. 
The big difference between “explanatory” and “predictive” approaches is thus 
not so much the underlying philosophy of science. Rather, they differ in their main 
goal of what should be achieved by the empirical endeavour. In an explanatory ap-
proach, as is the dominant practice in many applied statistical fi elds such as popu-
lation studies and economics, a hypothesis is translated into a formal model and 
tested with inferential statistical techniques such as linear regression and null-hy-
pothesis signifi cance testing (in the frequentist paradigm) on the basis of empirical 
data. If the regression coeffi cient is statistically different from zero, the association 
found in the data is unlikely given a null hypothesis is assumed to be true. If some 
other conditions are met, the effect is assumed to be causal. Formally, in a standard 
linear regression model of the form ŷ = α̂  + βƹ x, where values of an outcome ŷ are 
estimated as a function of an explanatory variable x with parameter weight βƹ  (and 
a constant α̂ ), the explanatory approach is most concerned with the estimation of 
parameter βƹ  (Mullainathan/Spiess 2017). “Mere” predictions are often dismissed as 
not advancing the fi eld by providing reliable evidence based on theory (Keuschnigg 
et al. 2018). 
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By contrast, a predictive model is more concerned with the outcome ŷ. The goal 
is to maximise predictive accuracy as defi ned, for instance, by the number of cor-
rectly predicted events as a proportion of all observed events in case of a dichoto-
mous outcome. Predictive models are much more widely used in the computer 
science and machine learning communities, and increasingly also in applied fi elds 
in business and industry (e.g. Kuhn/Johnson 2013). In these fi elds, there is often less 
emphasis put on “explanation”, and some even dismiss the necessity for theoretical 
models, causality and explanations per se (Anderson 2008). Indeed, in many appli-
cations such as the prediction of credit default, customer churn, or accident risks, it 
might suffi ce to have a data-driven approach with high predictive accuracy without 
a deeper understanding of the causal mechanisms for why two specifi c items are 
often bought together, or why a scanned image of a handwritten signature is more 
likely to belong to someone named “Smith” rather than “Miller”. The coeffi cient of a 
specifi c independent variable βƹ  is less interesting compared with correct forecasts 
of the outcome. Some model characteristics such as hyperparameters (e.g. number 
of hidden units in a neural network) are not even substantially informative.
A common critique of most explanatory approaches is the lack of model valida-
tions via out-of-sample predictions (e.g. Schrodt 2014). Since in most cases all of the 
data is used to obtain the model parameters, the model is likely to be overfi tted (e.g. 
Cranmer/Desmarais 2017). This means that the parameters are infl uenced by outli-
ers or other idiosyncrasies of the training dataset and the model would probably fail 
to produce good estimates for cases that were not part of the training set. This cri-
tique is arguably most appropriate if the data analysed do not come from a random 
sample of a population (as is the case in public opinion research for instance, where 
the frequentist paradigm of null-hypothesis signifi cance testing was developed), 
but are instead a non-random sample or the total population – as in, for instance: “all 
German municipalities with a population greater than 5,000”. These shortcomings 
are arguably major causes for today’s replication crisis in science. 
Predictive models using machine learning algorithms are increasingly applied to 
social science research, although their use is still comparatively rare. For instance, 
Bansak et al. (2018) used machine learning algorithms to geographically place refu-
gees in a way that their employment prospects improved signifi cantly. In this appli-
cation, the main question of interest is not whether a specifi c independent variable 
(e.g. a refugee’s level of education) infl uences the outcome signifi cantly. Therefore, 
a research design for causal identifi cation is less well suited, compared with a pre-
dictive model. In another example, Muchlinski et al. (2016) fi nd that machine learn-
ing algorithms such as random forests provide more accurate predictions of civil 
war onset as opposed to “traditional” regression-based approaches.
But predictive models alone are no panacea for arriving at more reliable evi-
dence (e.g. Athey 2017). Correlations that exist in big databases are often spurious 
(Calude/Longo 2017), and most machine learning algorithms do not give consistent 
estimates of which features are more important to the outcome and which are less 
so (Mullainathan/Spiess 2017). A machine learning algorithm discarding a certain 
feature does not therefore constitute a falsifi cation of a theory that claimed this 
feature to be important. This might be less problematic in some applications (e.g. 
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image recognition), but in other cases it is important to have at least a plausible idea 
of the underlying mechanisms at work. A combination of proxy variables that are 
highly correlated with the “real” causally relevant factors often produce predictive 
accuracies that are just as good as models informed by the true mechanisms. As 
a consequence, policy-related interpretations of the form: “Since X is given high 
importance by the algorithm, improving X will result in higher Y”, are invalid. This 
is important to note because practitioners and policy-makers might be tempted to 
interpret the results in such a way.
Thus, Susan Athey (2019) does not expect the increasing use of machine learning 
techniques in disciplines such as economics to have any substantial impact on the 
statistical theory of causal identifi cation. The latter will continue to be a main goal 
for researchers in these fi elds. Instead, machine learning algorithms will comple-
ment the standard econometric approaches, which might put an end to the “statisti-
cal monoculture” of linear and logistic regression that Schrodt (2014) complained 
about. In addition, practices that are widely used in machine learning such as cross-
validation and out-of-sample predictions can help applied research in economics 
and social sciences to overcome the problem of overfi tted models and purported 
fi ndings that fail replication (Cramner/Desmarais 2017). 
Our application is located somewhere on the continuum between a data-driven 
predictive model and a deductive-nomological explanatory approach. On the one 
hand, our goal is to make out-of-sample predictions: How well can future migra-
tion rates be predicted for municipalities that were not part of the training dataset? 
On the other hand, our predictive model is informed by theories and well-estab-
lished knowledge about mechanisms behind migration and residential mobility. 
Since there is no grand theory in demography and other social sciences, the various 
middle-range theories referred to in the previous chapter can guide variable selec-
tion and transformation (feature engineering). As such, the evidence produced by 
the model will hopefully prove to be more stable compared with pragmatic, purely 
data-driven approaches. However, strictly testing these theories of migratory be-
haviour or inferring policy recommendations is beyond the scope of this approach. 
Data
The main data source in this project is the “Wegweiser Kommune” (Bertelsmann 
Stiftung 2018), a database that contains various demographic and socio-economic 
indicators for more than 3,000 municipalities (Kommunen) in Germany. All German 
municipalities with a population greater than 5,000 are included in the database, 
although a small number of municipalities have dropped below this mark since the 
fi rst reference year from which the data are available (2008). The largest municipal-
ity is the city of Berlin with a population of more than 3.3 million, whereas the aver-
age population size of a municipality in the dataset is around 24,000. 
We thus have a non-random sample of municipalities that also shows systematic 
geographical patterns (see Fig. 6): Especially in rural areas in the states of Bavaria, 
Schleswig-Holstein, and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, large parts of the map 
consist of smaller municipalities with populations below 5,000. In these states, we 
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lack data on many rural areas. In the states of North Rhine-Westphalia or Saxony-An-
halt, by contrast, local government reforms resulted in fewer, but larger municipali-
ties. Finally, in Lower Saxony and Rhineland-Palatinate, there are many associations 
consisting of multiple smaller municipalities (Samtgemeinden) which are treated as 
a single municipality in the analyses. In the latter states, there are thus fewer areas 
Fig. 6: Map showing German municipalities that are included (in red) in the 
dataset (grey areas = not included)
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018
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for which we lack data. All in all, considering that many smaller municipalities are 
represented as unions of municipalities in the dataset, 5,850 or 51.3 percent of all 
German municipalities are included in the analysis. However, the total sample size is 
3,151 since associations of municipalities are treated as a single observation. 
The outcome variable of interest in this study, namely net migration, is reported 
in the dataset as the average yearly value for the fi ve years leading up to the report-
ing year. In other words, for the 2015 edition, net migration refers to the average net 
migration value (per 1,000 inhabitants) during the period from 2011 to 2015. This is 
our target variable which is reported for a variety of age groups. We focus on the 
two pre-defi ned demographic groups that the authors (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2018) 
refer to as “educational migration” (age group 18 to 24 years) and “family migration” 
(age groups 30 to 49 and 0 to 17).
Among the many indicators (N = 184) in the dataset, we excluded a number of 
variables that were either irrelevant to our question or too close to the defi nition of 
the dependent variable (e.g. total net migration, total population change). In addi-
tion, we excluded many indicators that were highly correlated (r > .95) with others; 
for instance, total balance of commuters out of a municipality vs. balance of male 
commuters vs. balance of female commuters, etc. We also excluded indicators that 
had more than 50 percent missing values, which is often the case for indicators 
that are only available at the district level or for larger agglomerations (e.g. share of 
children with a migrant background in kindergartens). This leaves us with 38 indica-
tors from the source database that are potentially considered for inclusion in the 
models (see Appendix). For each algorithm, a recursive feature elimination proce-
dure is built into the modelling pipeline in such a way that the model is trained with 
the optimal subset of features determined via cross-validation. This means that the 
algorithm may use all of the variables listed in the Appendix or only a subset if this 
results in greater predictive accuracy in the training data. 
Adding to the indicators from the Bertelsmann dataset, we assembled a number 
of other variables and merged them with the dataset. In particular, these were:
• Information on all long-distance and regional train stops in Germany obtained 
from the German railway company Deutsche Bahn. For each municipality, 
we coded whether a train station is present and whether long-distance trains 
also serve this station. As an additional variable, we calculated the distance to 
the nearest municipality with a station served by long-distance trains. These 
indicators are included because theoretical considerations suggested that 
good public transport connections are vital in attracting young people to mu-
nicipalities.
• We calculated the distance from each municipality to the nearest city with 
more than 50,000, more than 100,000, or more than 500,000 inhabitants. The 
idea is that short distances to cities, especially if combined with other fea-
tures such as good public transport links, is important for predicting net mi-
gration (see theory section).
• We coded whether a municipality had a university, how many students were 
enrolled at this university, as well as the distance to the nearest municipality 
with a university. We also counted the total number of university students 
enrolled within a radius of 20 km around each municipality.
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• A few indicators from the original dataset were transformed; e.g. we calcu-
lated the change in the share of foreigners over the past two years. 
Models of municipal migration
The basic idea is to train models based on past migration rates between the years 
2005 and 2009 and to use them to predict migration in the period between 2011 and 
2015 in previously unseen municipalities. The dataset consisting of 3,151 munici-
palities in Germany is divided into a training set (N = 2,543, i.e. 80 percent of the 
data) and a test set (N = 608, i.e. 20 percent) via a random split. Figure 7 depicts this 
procedure schematically. Variables with skewed distributions are log-transformed 
and non-binary indicators are z-normalised, resulting in mean = 0 and standard de-
viation = 1. This facilitates fi nding numerical solutions with many machine learning 
algorithms. Finally, an imputation routine based on a k-nearest-neighbour algorithm 
is applied to missing values. All of these preprocessing steps are performed with 
the preProcess() function included in R’s (R Core Team 2018) caret package (Kuhn 
2018). Importantly, these transformations are applied to the test data using only in-
formation (such as mean and standard deviation) from the training data. 
Next, 10-fold cross validation is performed on the training set. The data are di-
vided into 10 sets where nine serve as training sets and the remaining one as a 
validation set against which parameters are tuned. The procedure is repeated with 
Fig. 7: Schematic depiction of the procedure to partition the dataset and arrive 
at out-of-sample predictions
           Original dataset 
 
       Training data     Random split (80/20)           Test data 
 
      Cross validation      (Log-transformation,  
z-standardization, 
imputation…) 
 
 
 
                    Model evaluation: 
       Accuracy? 
  Predictions 
Source: own design
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each of the ten sets serving as the validation set, with the result that the entire da-
taset was used for both training and validation. The model with the best predictive 
performance on the training set is selected to produce predictions for the test set. 
As a predictive performance measure, we generally select R² since our outcome 
variable is continuous and it offers the most intuitive interpretation. As robustness 
tests, all predictions were also judged by their root mean squared error (RMSE), but 
the overall interpretation of the results did not change. 
We consider four popular algorithms: (1) Linear regression as the baseline; (2) a 
random forest; (3) an extreme gradient boosted tree; and (4) a deep neural network. 
These are four popular algorithms in applied research, with the latter two in particu-
lar often listed as (part of) the winning submissions in machine learning competi-
tions (Chollet/Allaire 2018). There are, of course, many other algorithms that are fre-
quently applied to regression problems, but for the sake of simplicity we confi ne the 
analysis to these four methods. Tree-based methods are more fl exible compared 
with regression models in terms of handling non-linear relationships and interac-
tions. In the case of multi-collinearity, however, the result of a tree-based algorithm 
is likely to be unstable since many of the variables could have served as substitutes 
for others. Random subspace methods used in random forests or gradient-boosted 
trees can improve this issue. Instead of one tree, many trees are grown using only 
a random subsample of all features (variables) as well as observations. The fi nal 
prediction comes from an ensemble of all trees where each tree votes which value 
to assign to a given observation. Peculiarities of the training dataset such as outliers 
will have less of an impact on the fi nal model used for predictions. 
Gradient boosting machines are also ensemble methods (of trees, in this case), 
but progress sequentially. After a tree is built, greater weights are assigned to badly 
predicted cases and the next tree tries to optimise these cases. Ensemble methods 
usually outperform single learners (such as a decision tree or a linear regression); 
on the other hand, they cannot easily be interpreted by humans (e.g. Zhou 2012). 
For random forests and (extreme) gradient boosted trees, we use caret’s wrapper 
function train() which calls algorithms from the randomForest and xgboost pack-
ages (Liaw/Wiener 2002; Chen et al. 2019). The model-building pipeline is set up 
to tune the hyperparameter mtry, i.e. the number of variables sampled as potential 
candidates at each tree node split. A few outliers with z-scores greater than 4 on the 
dependent variables were dropped since it is likely that these represented either 
measurement errors or extremely unusual changes, such as the installation of a 
state-wide reception centre for refugees in a small municipality.
To build neural networks, we use the keras package for R with a TensorFlow 
backend (Allaire/Chollet 2018). Deep neural networks are non-linear regression 
models with stacks of unobserved variables (hidden layers). The units in the hidden 
layers are a linear combination of the input variables, transformed by a non-linear 
activation function. We specify a convolutional neural network with two hidden lay-
ers with varying numbers of units and dropout layers with different weights for 
hyperparameter tuning. Deep neural networks have become widely used in recent 
years due to their ability to learn any kind of function, almost supplanting the need 
for feature engineering (Chollet/Allaire 2018). The fact that functional forms, feature 
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importance, and interactions between variables remain inside the black box is un-
problematic for many applications such as natural language processing or image 
recognition. In our application, it might be tempting to seek out mechanistic expla-
nations – why is this happening and what can we do against it – but this is not what 
the method can provide. 
5 Results
Figure 8 shows the predictive performance of four different algorithms. The models 
are trained on migration data between 2005 and 2009 and predict migration rates 
in the period between 2011 and 2015 in 608 previously unseen municipalities. The 
results show that migration rates among young people (18 to 24 years) can gener-
ally be predicted quite well (left-hand panel in Fig. 8). The best performing model 
(gradient boosted tree) achieves R² values of more than 50 percent, equivalent to 
correlations of r > 0.7 between the predictions and the actual observed values. The 
variation around the average predictive performance (marked with a dot) comes 
from different combinations of hyperparameters for the models other than linear 
regression. The well-known bias-variance tradeoff becomes apparent, with linear 
regression showing no variation in the forecasts but the results are furthest from the 
actual observations, compared with the other models. 
The “family” demographic group, by contrast, is less predictable in its migra-
tory behaviour. R² = .25 is the best value that could be achieved with an xgboost 
regressor. This refl ects the fact that patterns of family migration appeared to be less 
stable over time and had changed considerably by 2011-2015 compared with the 
mid-2000s (see Fig. 4 and 5). Sharp increases in immigration from other countries 
turned net migration rates in many cities from negative to positive, at the same time 
as native German families left the cities in ever greater numbers, resulting in higher 
infl ows into suburban and peripheral regions. These trends were “unpredictable” 
in the sense that, when looking at data from 2005 to2009, an accurate prediction of 
which cities and rural areas would gain many families on balance and which would 
lose inhabitants in these age groups would not have been possible. 
By contrast, the residential mobility of young people (18 to 24 years) was com-
paratively stable over time and is less affected by international migration. Yet, R² 
values of around 50 percent mean that there is still variation that is left unaccounted 
for by the models. Arguably, the trend towards ever higher participation rates in 
tertiary education that accelerated during the study period is a crucial factor in this 
regard. This pushes young people to municipalities with universities in even greater 
numbers than before. At the same time, skyrocketing housing prices in large uni-
versity cities contribute to a suburbanisation even among this young demographic 
group, but only in certain regions such as the greater Munich, Stuttgart or Frankfurt 
areas (see Fig. 2).
Figures 9 and 10 plot the predicted values against the actual observations for the 
standardised migration rates of young people (Fig. 9) and families (Fig. 10) from the 
two xgboost algorithms. Again, it is obvious that the predicted values for young-
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age migration anticipate the actual observations quite well (r = 0.7 between pre-
dicted and observed values). With regard to family migration (Fig. 12), this generally 
proves to be more diffi cult (r = 0.5), mirroring what we learned from the descriptive 
analyses. 
In order to better understand which features prove useful in predicting migration 
rates (without making causal claims), Figures 11 and 12 plot decision trees for young-
age and family migration, respectively. Note that these are exemplary trees and do 
not necessarily refl ect what the majority of trees in the random forest, for instance, 
yield as results. But they intuitively show how the algorithm arrives at its results. 
Here we can also note the trade-off between better interpretability (as provided by 
the decision tree) and greater predictive accuracy by a “black box” ensemble model 
(e.g. as a random forest). For the sake of simplicity, tree depth is limited to three. At 
the leaf nodes, the boxplots show the distribution of the dependent variable in the 
respective group, the mean value being the prediction made by the model. 
For the 18 to 24 years age group, the share of foreigners in a municipality is be-
ing used as the fi rst split to separate the data. The second split refers to the share 
of sealed (urban) land. Municipalities that have a below-average share of foreigners 
and a very low share of sealed land are characterised by the lowest migration rate, 
i.e. a large out-migration of young people. The municipalities that attract the larg-
est number of people aged 18 to 24 years are those with an above-average share of 
foreigners, a very low share of one or two-family homes, and a very high number of 
university students. 
The exemplary regression tree in Figure 11 shows several of the characteristics 
that make tree-based models in general more fl exible compared with linear regres-
sion. First, non-linear relationships can easily be accounted for by the model. For 
instance, while the share of foreigners has a considerable impact when splitting 
the data near the average value (fi rst split), splitting the data has less of an effect 
Fig. 8: Predictive performance (R²) of four algorithms in predicting migration 
among people aged 18 to 24 years (left-hand panel) and family-age 
groups (30 to 49 and 0 to 17 years) (right-hand panel). Variation around 
coeffi cients is caused by different hyperparameter values
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at higher values of the predictor (compare nodes 12 and 13). In addition, complex 
interaction effects are detected by the tree. For instance, as noted above, a greater 
share of foreigners is generally associated with more in-migration by young people. 
However, when a high share of foreigners coincides with a rural setting (many one 
or two-family homes, low share of sealed land, see node 20), these rural munici-
palities with many foreigners actually attract slightly fewer young people compared 
with urban and rich municipalities with few foreigners (node 8). 
Again, the position of variables and their importance as indicated by the tree can-
not be interpreted in a causal way. For instance, the share of foreigners is the most 
important variable according to the algorithm and is highly correlated with many 
other variables, in particular those that are characteristics of urban areas. While it is 
obvious that urban areas with more foreigners show higher infl ows of young peo-
ple, the model provides no evidence for a causal or policy-oriented interpretation of 
the sort: “Increasing the share of foreigners in a municipality will, everything else 
being equal, lead to more young people settling there in the future”. The only theo-
retical mechanism that points in this direction is the migrant networks mechanism 
Fig. 9: Predicted and observed values for the migration rate among people 
aged 18 to 24 years in 608 municipalities in the unseen test data, 
2011–2015 (z-standardised)
Source: own calculations
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which states that international migrants tend to move to places where many of their 
compatriots already live. However, for larger cities at least (compare Fig. 4 and 5), 
international migration is not the most decisive factor in this age group. 
Figure 12 plots a decision tree with depth = 3 for migration rates among peo-
ple aged 30 to 49 and underage children. The algorithm selects child poverty as 
the most important feature to divide the dataset. Families leave areas with a high 
child poverty rate and high unemployment. A low rate of child poverty, many highly 
qualifi ed workers, and a favourable rate of employment for women in comparison 
with men are factors associated with a large infl ow of families. The lower overall 
predictive accuracy of the models is refl ected by the fact that many of the leaf nodes 
in Figure 12 do not differ much in their average migration rate. 
Fig. 10: Predicted and observed values for the family-age (30 to 49 and 
underage children) migration rate in 608 municipalities in the unseen 
test data, 2011–2015 (z-standardised)
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6 Conclusions
How useful are regional demographic forecasts? Recent trends in local population 
growth have disproved many predictions which assumed that most German dis-
tricts would experience population decline rather than growth. Just a few years ago, 
given the demographic outlook, public housing projects were abandoned, schools 
were closed and fewer teachers were hired in many regions. Now, by contrast, as 
a consequence of considerable population growth throughout most of Germany, 
there is a severe shortage of housing, too few kindergarten teachers and nurses, 
and overcrowded public transport, roads, and hospitals. It is therefore obvious that 
short and medium-term demographic forecasts, if reliable, would be a useful tool 
for local policy-makers. 
How well, then, can municipal migration and residential mobility be predicted 
fi ve to ten years into the future? In general, this proves to be very diffi cult, even with 
sophisticated methods and detailed data at the municipal level. The main reason for 
this is the volatility of international migration over time. Whereas in the late 2000s, 
net migration to Germany was close to zero or even negative, an all-time high was 
recorded just a few years later. Statisticians and qualitative experts failed to pre-
dict this trend – and at the sub-national level such predictions become even more 
diffi cult. While immigration has decreased in recent years since 2015, it is still at a 
much higher level than in previous decades. Similarly, while the infl ow of refugees 
is currently much lower than it was in 2015 and 2016, the fi gure of approximately 
180,000 per year in 2018 still represents more than a fi vefold increase on rates seen 
a decade ago. For small municipalities in particular, the uncertainties of how many 
more migrants will arrive in the next few years, how many will be allowed to stay 
permanently, and how many will potentially relocate to bigger cities, have a strong 
infl uence on the local demographic outlook. 
However, not everything is uncertain. The breakdown into two different age 
groups reveals that some trends are more stable and predictable than others. In 
particular, the residential mobility of young people aged 18 to 24 years can be pre-
dicted quite well fi ve to ten years into the future. The general pattern of these peo-
ple leaving rural areas and settling in big cities with universities prevails. It is likely 
that the continued expansion of tertiary education will reinforce the trend of young 
people leaving remote areas without universities and moving to larger cities. Since 
more remote areas also provide limited employment opportunities for graduates 
of disciplines such as cultural studies or media science, these moves will often be 
permanent. There are also a few mechanisms that have changed, though. The al-
location of young refugees to rural areas partly reversed the negative migration 
rate in some regions. A shortage of housing and skyrocketing rent prices result in 
young people settling in the suburban surroundings of large industrial areas such as 
Munich or Stuttgart. As a consequence, Munich is no longer the most sought-after 
city among young people and is the only large city (together with Bremen) where 
infl ows of young people have decreased somewhat. 
What can be done about this? While our statistical models do not allow for causal 
and policy-oriented interpretations, there are a number of measures that are likely 
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to affect young-age migration. Given the trend towards an ever greater share of 
secondary school leavers going on to university, setting up new universities (of 
applied sciences) in rural areas is likely to prevent some of the young people from 
leaving the region. These new established universities can specialise in disciplines 
that are linked to the local labour market. At the more aggregated state and national 
level, policy-makers might want to reconsider whether the extensive educational 
expansion of recent years should be continued at the same pace in future. Today, 
labour shortages are occurring in many jobs that require vocational training, such as 
kindergarten teachers, nurses, and craftspeople. In rural areas, these jobs dominate 
over occupations that typically require tertiary education. 
A very different set of conclusions can be drawn for residential mobility among 
families consisting of middle-aged people (30 to 49 years) and underage children. 
Predicting the migratory behaviour of this group into the future is much more dif-
fi cult than that for the young age group. In the 2000s, families tended to leave big 
cities and settle in the surrounding suburbs or in more rural areas. This is still true 
for native Germans; in fact, this trend has accelerated among this group and the 13 
largest German cities witnessed a surge in emigration of German families between 
2011 and 2015. However, immigrant families have moved into the large cities in ever 
greater numbers, reversing the overall trend for residential mobility in the family 
age group. The majority of the largest German cities are now actually attracting 
more families on balance than are leaving. In addition, native families leaving the 
cities contribute to high population growth in the surrounding districts of large cities 
such as Berlin or Munich, but even municipalities situated further away from the city 
are now increasingly becoming net receivers of family migration. 
There are certainly a few limitations to this study, e.g. regarding the availability 
of data at the level of municipalities. If we were able to further disaggregate the age 
groups or provenance (within-country mobility vs. international migration) and ana-
lyse directed fl ows rather than net migration, the predictive accuracy of the models 
would certainly be higher with regard to some groups (e.g. mobility behaviour of 
native Germans aged 30 to 39). On the other hand, international migration would 
still be the hardest factor to predict accurately, so a forecast of total population 
change in broadly-defi ned age groups (e.g. underage children in order to forecast 
the demand for teachers), which is of practical interest to local policy-makers, would 
still achieve only moderate levels of predictive accuracy. 
In sum, it is hard to predict whether the current trends will continue in the near 
future. Many of the patterns described above are intertwined; for instance, as more 
immigrants move into the city centres and housing costs rise, natives are more 
likely to relocate to the suburbs. However, municipalities surrounding Munich or 
Stuttgart are already highly-priced when it comes to housing and are also densely 
populated, so if families want lower housing costs, this requires ever further com-
mutes to work in these regions. If immigration from other countries were to decline 
in the coming years, the populations of big cities would start to decrease on bal-
ance, since natives are already leaving these cities in considerable numbers. This 
might in turn make the core cities more attractive again for young people who are 
currently moving to the suburbs due to the lack of affordable apartments in the city 
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centres. Trend reversals of this sort would be hard to anticipate, especially since 
international migration is the big unknown variable in all demographic forecasts. 
However, international migration can be regulated by national and European migra-
tion policies, so to a certain extent policy-makers have the means to frame the next 
demographic forecasts.
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Appendix
Tab. A1: Feature labels and descriptive statistics
Feature label Valid N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Population size 3,148 23,763 93,863 4,215 3,326,002
Population density 3,151 4.027 5.760 0.000 75.586
Share of welfare recipients among
workers (per 1,000) 3,125 31.829 4.792 10.000 56.000
Share of welfare recipients among
working males 3,099 28.376 5.816 6.000 68.421
Share of employment in primary
sector 1,997 1.920 3.000 0.020 29.860
Share of employment in secondary
sector 2,944 37.785 15.575 2.870 84.600
Unemployment rate, persons aged
15-25 years 3,114 2.880 2.078 0.300 16.100
Unemployment rate 3,114 4.627 2.756 0.900 19.000
Share of foreigners 2,500 5.491 4.210 0.200 33.200
Share of foreigners older than 65
years 1,769 3.194 2.346 0.100 17.100
Share of employed persons in
vocational training 3,102 6.032 1.329 2.200 11.900
Share of welfare recipients among
foreigners 1,625 15.181 8.758 0.700 63.200
Part-time workers per 1,000 residents 3,109 95.277 22.903 19.548 220.952
Share of age group 65 to 79 years 3,114 15.647 2.403 7.500 29.100
Birth rate 3,105 7.720 1.073 4.000 12.800
Mortality rate 3,105 10.751 2.436 4.500 26.900
Mean age 3,102 44.331 2.145 37.400 53.300
Share of age group 80 or older 3,114 5.416 1.079 2.200 10.900
Mean apartment size per resident 2,996 46.361 4.109 16.900 69.500
Share of 1-family or 2-family homes 3,099 61.873 18.115 10.500 96.100
Growth in the number of jobs in the
past 5 years in % 3,093 8.559 11.094 -46.600 117.900
Share of employment in private
sector services 2,961 8.583 6.491 0.200 74.700
Dynamics of employment in private
sector services, past 5 years 2,902 46.554 81.142 -96.300 837.500
Share of highly qualifi ed workers 3,043 9.284 4.995 1.500 62.100
Share of employed inhabitants
among all inhabitants (18 to 64 years) 3,102 55.399 4.410 21.300 70.900
Share of employed females among
all female inhabitants (18 to 64 years) 3,035 50.631 5.307 21.200 71.600
Female employment rate as a share
of the male employment rate 3,027 84.553 9.735 56.300 123.100
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Feature label Valid N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Share of highly qualifi ed residents 3,114 11.372 4.965 2.800 37.800
Gross tax revenue in the municipality 2,422 682.145 179.026 226.800 999.900
Rate of commuters into the
municipality 2,906 65.092 11.431 7.639 95.568
Rate of commuters out of
the municipality 2,915 71.924 15.523 9.301 97.262
Youth unemployment rate 3,115 6.540 3.928 0.800 29.100
Child poverty rate 2,944 11.495 8.000 1.100 51.300
Share of sealed/urban land 2,828 19.021 11.253 2.507 95.000
Long-term unemployment rate 3,087 2.641 2.352 0.136 40.397
Recreational space per inhabitant 2,816 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.060
Employment rate of foreigners
relative to total 1,819 66.369 16.056 7.451 133.461
Relative number of fatal accidents in
transportation 3,069 4.735 1.854 0.596 21.218
Long-distance train connection 3,151 0.092 0.290 0.000 1.000
Public transport connection 3,151 0.583 0.493 0.000 1.000
Distance to long-distance train
connection 3,147 16.937 12.790 0.000 83.882
Distance to city >100,000 inhabitants 3,147 35.388 23.994 0.000 173.557
Distance to city >50,000 inhabitants 3,147 22.633 16.118 0.000 151.670
Distance to city >500,000 inhabitants 3,147 81.283 50.247 0.000 352.297
Number of university students 3,151 1,023 7,481 0.000 185,161
University city (yes/no) 3,151 0.052 0.222 0.000 1.000
Distance to nearest university 3,147 20.743 13.248 0.000 106.145
Number of students in 20 km radius 3,147 13,600 26,780 0.000 210,249
Migration rate, 18 to 24 years 
(2011-2015 average) 3,122 -8.169 38.149 -128.767 316.429
Migration rate, families
(2011-2015 average) 3,132 12.637 9.781 -24.896 184.017
Migration rate, 18 to 24 years
(2005-2009 average) 3,085 -21.850 29.031 -130.500 181.600
Migration rate, families
(2005-2009 average) 3,082 1.004 6.873 -21.200 46.500
Change in share of foreigners,
2 years 2,367 0.474 0.768 -1.465 1.891
Tab. A1: Continuation
Source: own calculations
Published by
Prof. Dr. Norbert F. Schneider
Federal Institute for Population Research 
D-65180 Wiesbaden / Germany
 2020
Managing Editor 
Prof. Dr. Johannes Huinink
Dr. Katrin Schiefer
Editorial Assistant
Beatriz Feiler-Fuchs
Wiebke Hamann
Layout
Beatriz Feiler-Fuchs
E-mail: cpos@bib.bund.de
Scientifi c Advisory Board
Karsten Hank (Cologne)
Michaela Kreyenfeld (Berlin)
Marc Luy (Vienna) 
Natalie Nitsche (Rostock)
Zsolt Spéder (Budapest)
Rainer Wehrhahn (Kiel)
Comparative Population Studies
www.comparativepopulationstudies.de
ISSN: 1869-8980 (Print) – 1869-8999 (Internet)
Board of Reviewers
Bruno Arpino (Barcelona)
Kieron Barclay (Rostock)
Laura Bernardi (Lausanne)
Gabriele Doblhammer (Rostock)
Anette Eva Fasang (Berlin)
Michael Feldhaus (Oldenburg)
Tomas Frejka (Sanibel)
Alexia Fürnkranz-Prskawetz (Vienna)
Birgit Glorius (Chemnitz)
Fanny Janssen (Groningen)
Frank Kalter (Mannheim)
Stefanie Kley (Hamburg)
Bernhard Köppen (Koblenz)
Anne-Kristin Kuhnt (Duisburg)
Hill Kulu (St Andrews)
Nadja Milewski (Rostock)
Roland Rau (Rostock)
Thorsten Schneider (Leipzig)
Tomas Sobotka (Vienna)
Jeroen J. A. Spijker (Barcelona)
Heike Trappe (Rostock)
Helga de Valk (The Hague)
Sergi Vidal (Barcelona)
Michael Wagner (Cologne)
